Ирак--шииты, сунниты, аль Садр

US Инкогнито #08.05.2004 03:24



Аль Садр явно не оправдывает надежды местной миролюбивой общественности. Как раз только что видел--отстреливают егоных туземцев стахановскими темпами--дюжину тут, дюжину там...

В общем, сами читайте.

Iraq: Shia Out of Patience With Al-Sadr?
May 06, 2004 2058 GMT


Reuters reported May 6 that a U.S. military contingent composed of eight heavy vehicles and six light vehicles entered Karbala unopposed, destroyed the offices of radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr and assumed a position 500 meters (1,650 feet) from two shrines sacred to the Shia. U.S. forces fought their way into An Najaf earlier, and heavy fighting continues.

A number of significant developments centered in and around the southern Iraqi Shiite strongholds of An Najaf and Karbala grabbed headlines May 6. Chief among those were the seizure of administrative offices in An Najaf and the movement of a U.S. military convoy into central Karbala. These relatively aggressive maneuvers — after the kid-glove approach the military had been taking with militants in the holy cities — suggest a broad rejection of al-Sadr and his Mehdi Army.

It has been known for some time that senior Shiite leadership — both from Iraq and Iran — were in close contact with al-Sadr and were likely to be negotiating between him and the U.S. military. It now seems that, if these negotiations have not ended, they have at least reached some sort of status quo in which the senior Shia seem to be distancing themselves from al-Sadr and leaving him to his own devices — and in the hands of the United States.

A well-placed source within the Iranian clergy relayed to Stratfor on May 6 the overriding opinions of al-Sadr within the Shiite elite.

The Stratfor sources said al-Sadr has elicited dislike from even the more hard-line clerics in the Iranian hierarchy. We are told that his behavior toward Expediency Council chief and former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was unacceptable. Rafsanjani is perhaps the most influential man in the Islamist republic's clerical hierarchy, and by crossing him al-Sadr could have compromised any possibility of support from Tehran.

The dominant Shiite position is one of disappointment and disillusionment with al-Sadr. The majority of Shia have aligned themselves with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani at the expense of al-Sadr. Stratfor has suggested in the past that al-Sistani and the central core of Shiite leaders were tolerating al-Sadr's uprising because it served as a reminder to the United States of the danger it could face if Iraq's Shiite majority felt marginalized.

Once the U.S. military entered into legitimate negotiations with the Sunni guerrillas in Al Fallujah, the Shiite expectation of dominance in post-occupation Iraq was thrown into serious doubt. Al-Sadr proved to be the perfect tool for keeping U.S. focus on the Shia. But his usefulness was always a hair's breadth away from being counterproductive. Today's events may signal that the Shiite leadership feels the situation might have crossed that thin line.

The United States chose to move for one of two reasons: Either it received a direct message from al-Sistani (or from Tehran), or Washington is simply getting ahead of the curve in acting on the Shiite leadership's disillusionment with al-Sadr.

The U.S. military actions are on a limited scale — fighting only in the newer part of An Najaf, well away from the city center, and sending only one company into central Karbala — but the United States would not have moved against al-Sadr at all if it did not have assurances that a mass Shiite uprising would not follow. Still, the United States will be very careful how it treads in the holy cities. As Washington is well aware, even if al-Sadr does not enjoy broad support among the Shiite leadership, one misstep into the mosques or shrines of An Najaf and Karbala — which are central to the Shiite faith — could trigger a mandatory militant response. And this assumes that the Mehdi Army does not switch to the style of urban guerrilla fighting that so plagued U.S. forces in Al Fallujah.

In the end, regardless of how the Shia came to this point (and no matter what happens to al-Sadr) the assurance of Shiite rule in post-occupation Iraq remains the No. 1 priority of al-Sistani and company — and was likely a key part of any deal or tacit agreement that has been reached.
Рецидивист под пристальным оком спецнадзора.

(для трижды уважаемой администрации: всё вышесказанное--сугубо моё личное скромное субьективное ХО, ни в коей мере не претендуещее на правду в последней инстанции, и основанное исключительно на моем индивидуальном восприятии.)  

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