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Georgians anticipated no response and Russian pilots expected no opposition
A sobering exercise for the Russians has been sorting out the details of their military performance in the two-week conflict with Georgia. At least one Russian Su-25 Frogfoot ground attack aircraft appears to have been shot down by friendly fire, says a Washington-based U.S. defense official. Chaotic flight activity during the air war apparently led to Russia’s rebel allies firing at them, he says.
Senior Russian military officials, both active and recently retired, are loudly criticizing early setbacks in Georgia which included problems in air defense suppression, intelligence analysis and warnings, air attack planning and speed of response. They also point to the deployment of older T-62 and T-72 tanks and outdated armored personnel carriers for the initial push into East Ossetia that were about an equal match for the Georgian armor.
But the biggest technical error, says former Russian air force commander-in-chief Gen. Anatoly Kornukov, is that Russian intelligence failed to analyze the numbers, locations and capabilities of the Georgian air defenses. As a result, Russian pilots went into combat expecting no resistance. Secondly, there was no campaign to eliminate the Georgia air defense or its small air force. Thirdly, there was no reason to use a strategic bomber like the Tu-22M3, he says.
Anti-radiation missiles were not fired against the Georgian air defense radars, despite their availability, which meant that Russian aircrews could not use their precision standoff weapons without being in range of Georgia’s Buk-1M (SA-11 Gadfly) surface-to-air missile systems. Prior to the conflict, the Russian air force did fire a Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter) from a Su-24 Fencer, but the weapon missed its target, a radar outside of Gori. Some observers also note the limited availability of Russian precision, long-range, standoff weaponry.
These opinions—appearing in Russia’s Independent Military Review, other defense related publications and Russian news agencies—have caught the attention of U.S. government officials and analysts who have been pouring over open-source literature to gather operational and technological clues to events in the Georgia-Russia conflict.
Gen. Mahmut Gareyev, president of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, also blamed military intelligence for the classic failure of miscalculating Georgia’s intentions. The resulting confusion in Russia’s command and control led to its air force taking so many losses, including a front-line, high-performance Tu-22M aircraft which now appears to have been a bomber variant operated by the Black Sea Fleet.
Other Russian critics contend the Russians made little or no use of its space-based surveillance and that the rough terrain and heavy vegetation of Georgia foiled the long-range use of laser-guided weapons.
Russian cosmonaut Oleg Kononenko, flying on the International Space Station, is being criticized by some U.S. observers for using a digital camera equipped with an 800-mm. telephoto lens and a video camera to image what a Russian official said were “after-effects of border conflict operations in the Caucasus” on Aug. 9, soon after the Georgian army pushed into East Ossetia. Using the space station for military purposes violates the ISS cooperation agreement between NASA and the Russian space agency. The Russians say the images were “requested to support potential humanitarian activities in the area including serious water resource management issues.”
Lack of preparation hindered the Russian air force, says its former commander-in-chief, Gen. Peter Deinekin, who accused the service of handing the initiative to the Georgians. He excoriated the air force for not immediately launching an air attack to blind Georgia’s radar and reconnaissance capability and then shatter command and control.
Claims that Russia tried to bomb the Georgian oil pipelines are losing credibility. Analysts contend that bomb craters near some underground pipelines appear to be from a missed attack by the Tu-22M3 Backfire on a nearby airfield. “Had they been targeting the pipeline, they would have gone for the pumping stations, but did not,” a Washington-based U.S. official says. “Why try to hit a buried pipeline when the pumping stations made a much easier target? It may simply point to inaccurate bombing from the Backfire.”
Former Russian Defense Minister Gen. Paul Grachev cast blame on all the Russian intelligence services for lack of warning, and on commanders of the North Caucasus Military District for not having detailed contingency plans in case of an attack by Georgia. Other lessons drawn from the fighting in Georgia, say Russian military officials, are that while the offensive into Georgia was morally justified, the offensive was poorly organized and executed in the opening phases.
Maj. Gen. Marat Kulakhmetov, commander of the Russian peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia, is being blamed for ignoring the massing of Georgian tanks, artillery and troops near Tskhinvali on Aug. 7, according to Grachev.
The lack of an immediate counter-attack against Georgian forces that entered the zone occupied by Russian peacekeeping troops Grachev deems inexcusable. Not laying counter-battery fire onto Georgian artillery (which was concentrated to support the attack) was another blunder, he says. The penetration allowed the Georgians a toehold in South Ossetia’s capital, and digging them out caused damage to the city’s infrastructure.